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LEGISLATION.
THE UNIFORm FIDUCIARIES ACT-In the initial application of the equitable
principle that he who participates in a breach of trust may be held liable to the
cestui que trust,1 the courts strictly construed the doctrine against the third party,
readily implying notice of the intended breach, and requiring the utmost investigation of the trustee's acts. There could be no objection to a rigid enforcement of penalties against a trustee or other fiduciary, who had violated his fiducial relationship, nor likewise to an application of similar rules to one who
participated knowingly; but the imposition upon third parties dealing with a
fiduciary of a duty to supervise the conduct of the latter became intolerable,
proving itself a moral injustice to third parties and resulting in a serious retardation of the administration of trusts. 2 Consequently there developed in the
law, by means of the modifications of judicial exceptions and the complete
alteration of legislative enactments, a trend favoring third persons. The most
recent evidence of this is the Uniform Fiduciaries Act,' which is the ultinua
thule of constructive notice to third parties of a breach of trust.
Upon adoption by the various states, the acts drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 4 would seem to fulfil their
obvious purpose of uniformity; but they also bestow the unmentioned benefit
of advancing the law upon that subject to its most modern point. Having been
drafted by experts, considered section by section by a special committee and the
conference, they represent, not the law of the majority of jurisdictions, but
what is deemed the most suitable remedy of the evil attacked. Therefore, this
act, although not the subject of constant litigation, is worthy, nevertheless, of
consideration as manifesting the future of the field.
The Act, despite the broad and indefinite scope of its title,5 is limited to
the liabilities of persons dealing with one, knowing him to be a fiduciary, and
it disregards "constructive" notice of this fact.6 Its sole purpose is to facilitate the performance by the fiduciaries of their obligations by establishing uni'If one has received and still holds the trust property or its proceeds he may be held
as a constructive trustee thereof; if he has never received or no longer holds the trust
property or its proceeds, he may be held liable for damages. Indiana etc. Ry. Co. v. Swanell,
157 Ill. 616, 41 N. E. 989 (1895) ; Bundy v. Monticello, 84 Ind. iig (1882) ; Inv re Champion,
[1893] I Ch. ioi.
2Sir William Grant expresses 'his dissatisfaction with the rule in Balfour v. Welland, 16
Ves. 151, I56 (Eng. i8og).
PThe Act since its inception in 1922 has been adopted in the following I5 states: CoLO.
ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) §§ 403n-403a(I) ; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. II, § 3; Idaho Laws (1925)
c. 217; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) c. 14oa; IND. ANN. STAT. (Bums, Supp. 1929)
§§ 8oo6.1-8oo6.14; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. (Marr, Supp. 1926) pp. 692-695; MD. ANN. CODE
(Bagby, Supp. 1929) art. 37A; NEv. ComP. LAws (Hillyer, i929) §§ 2985-3000; N. J. Comp.
STAT. (Supp. 1930) §§ 222-23a (i) to 222-23a (4) ; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929)
§§ 51-10, to 51-112; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, I931) c. 36A; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 20, §§3311-3414; Utah Laws (I925) c. 86; Wis. STAT. (ig3i) c.iia; Wyo. REv.
STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) c. 43. Compare somewhat similar statutes, Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §4707; R. I. Laws (193o) c. 1561.
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'It is not the purpose of the conference "to back a complete code of law" at this time
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form and definite rules as to "constructive" notice of breaches of their obligations.'
The feature of importance in the definitive sections, which define bank,'
fiduciary,9 person, 10 principal,n and good faith, 12 is that the definition of good
faith accords with the Negotiable Instruments Law," adopting the subjective
test of honesty rather than the objective one of negligence.
At common law the bona fide purchaser of trust property was held liable
in equity to the cestui que trust if the trustee misappropriated the purchase price.
The reason was that, at equity, a receipt to be valid must be that of the real
owner, who, in such jurisprudence, is the cestui que trust.'- The result was
twofold: the purchaser hesitated to deal with a trustee unless the trust instrument provided for freedom from liability, and the courts attempted to evade
the rule. Wherever it was possible to imply in the terms of the trust an intention 1 that the trustee was to have the power to give a valid receipt, the courts
did so. Such an intention was inferred from the fact that the trustee could use
his discretion in the application of the purchase price,16 or that he was required
to reinvest 1'or generally distribute it,'8 or to pay debts in general, 19 or to pay
debts and legacies, 20 or to pay debts and apply the balance to the support of
"Ibid.
' Section I (I) "'Bank' includes any person or association of persons, whether incorporated or not, carrying on the business of banking." 9 U. L. A. 147; cf. N. I. L. § 191.
'Section i (i) "'Fiduciary' includes a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied,
resulting or constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, curator, receiver,
trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or private, public officer, or any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity
for any person, trust or estate." 9 U. L. A. 147.
10 Section I (I)
"'Person' includes a corporation, partnership, or other association, or
two or more persons having a joint or common interest." 9 U. L. A. 147. Cf. N. I. L.
§ 191; UNIFORM SALES ACT § 76; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE REcEIPTs ACT § 58; UNIFORM
BILS OF LADING ACT
ACT § 2.

'Section

§ 53;

UNIFORM STOCK TRAsNsFER ACT

§ 2z;

UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP

I (I) "'Principal' includes any person to whom a fiduciary as such owes an

obligation."

9 U. L. A. 147.
' Section I (2) "A thing is done 'in good faith' within the meaning of this act, when it

is in fact done honestly, whether it be done negligently or not." 9 U. L. A. 147. Cf. Acts
cited supra note 10.
' N. I. L. § 56, "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the

title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had

actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in
taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." See Note (1933) U. OF PA. L. REv. 617. For
citation of cases upon interpretation of this section of the N. I. L., see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW (Beutel's ed. 1932) 572 et seq.
"Duffy v. Calvert, 6 Gill 487, 517 (Md. 1848) ; Weatherby v. St. Giorgio, 2 Hare 624
(Eng. 1843).
' But see Stroughill v. Anstey and Forbes v. Peacock (1853) 17 JuRrST, pt. 2, 242, at
252, where it is asserted that prior to the decision of the latter case [ii Sim. 152 (184o) ] the
rule was founded on necessity, because it would be impossible to satisfy a purchaser.
"Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat. 421 (U. S. 1823); Law Guarantee and Trust Co. v.
Jones, lO3 Tenn. 245, 58 S. W. 219 (19oo) ; Doran v. Wiltshire, 3 Swans. 699 (Eng. 1792).
' Keister v. Scott, 61 Md. 507 (1883) ; Turner v. Hoyle, 95 Mo. 337, 8 S.W. 157 (1888) ;
Clairborne v. Holland, 88 Va. 1O46, 14 S. E. 915 (1892) ; Locke v. Lomas, 5 De G. & S.
326 (Eng. 1852).
Grant v. Hook, 13 S. & R. 259 (Pa. 1825) ; Hannum v. Spear, I Yeates 553 (Pa. 1795).
Potter v. Gardner, 12 Wheat. 498 (U. S. 1827) ; Grotenkemper v. Bryson, 79 Ky. 353
(1881) ; Dewey's Executors v. Ruggles, 25 N. J.Eq. 35 (1874); Conover v. Stothoff, 38 N.
J. Eq. 55 (1884) ; Hauser v. Shore, 5 Ired. Eq. 357 (N. C. 1848) ; Williamson v. Curtis, 3
Bro. C. C. 95 (Eng. 1790).
'Andrews v. Sparhawk, 13 Pick. 393 (Mass. 1833) ; Grant v. Hook, 13 S. & R. 259
(Pa. 1825) ; Stroughill v. Anstey, I De G., M. & G. 635 (Eng. 1852).
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someone, 21 or to pay to one unborn or under age or otherwise not having legal
capacity or existence. 22 In fact there were so many exceptions to the rule that
the rule became the exception. 2 3 In England at an early date immunity was
of those states of the
given by statute. 24 Similar statutes were enacted in most
2
United States in which this doctrine gained a foothold. 1
Section 220 of the FiduciariesAct is based upon these statutes, being applicable to all fiduciaries, not merely trustees, and to all transfers not merely paythis applies only when
ments of money. However, it must be remembered that
27
the fiduciary is authorized to receive such payments.
In the United States, a corporation which, having notice that shares are
held in trust, 28 registers the transfer of them without reasonable inquiry as to
the powers and obligations of the trustee, is liable for the proximate consequences 29 of its participation in the breach of trust if such occurs. 0 The corporation must decide correctly whether it should register the transfer; if it is
wrong, either the cestui que trust or purchaser may recover.2" This doctrine,
which never prevailed in England, 2 has been repudiated by modern statutes
in certain states of the United States. 8"
"Stall v. Cincinnati, 16 Ohio St. I69 (1865).

'Woodwine v. Woodrun, ig'W. Va. 67 (r881); cf. Balfour v. Welland, supra note 2;
Groom v. Booth, i Drew. 548, 566 (Eng. 1853).
STORY, EQUITY JURiSPRUDEiCE (Ilth ed. 1873) § 1135, "These are some of the
'Cf.
most important and nice distinctions which have been adopted by courts, of equity upon this
intricate topic; and they lead strongly to the conclusion, to which not only eminent jurists
but also eminent judges have arrived, that it would have been far better to have held in all
cases, that the party, having the right to sell, had also the right to receive the purchase
money . . .
"Trustee Act, 56 and 57 VIcM. c. 53 § 20 (1893) ; 22 and 23 Vicr. c. 35 § 23 (1859).
-ALA. CIrv. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 6916; CAL. CIrv. CODE (Deering, 193) § 2244; IND.
ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 13457; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 67 § 409; KY. STAT.
(Carroll, 1930) c. 128 §4707; Mass. Laws (1918) v. 68, §2; MicH. Coup. LAws (1929)
§ 12988; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8ioi; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) c. 26 § 3144; MONT.
REV. CODE (Choate, I921) c. 49 § 7901; N. J. COMP'. STAT. (igio) p. 2267; N. Y. REAl. PRop.
LAW (1918) § xo8; N. D. Coup. LAws ANN. (1913) §6294; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) c.
303 §4410; S.D. Coup. LAws (1929) § 1208; WIs. STAT. (1931) § 231.22. Cf. DsEn. REV.
CODE (1915) c. 98 § 3395; 30rro GEN. CODE (Throckmorton, 193o) c. 4 § 11027.
-UNIFORI FnmuclAmas AcT § 2, 9 U. L. A. 149.
"In the absence of statute, a trustee has no implied power of sale, and a purchaser who
has notice that he is purchasing trust property is bound to inquire as to the authority of the
trustee (except as limited by the laws of negotiable instruments). O'Herron v. Gray, 168

Mass. 573, 47 N. E. 429 (i897); Gibney v. Allen, 156 Mich. 301, 120 N. W. SI (o9) ;
Ludington v. Mercantile National Bank, 102 App. Div. 251, 92 N. Y. Supp. 454 (1905);
PERRY, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 80o. An executor has an iimplied power of
sale, Shaw v. Spencer, 1oo Mass. 382 (1868) ; Russell v. Plaice, i8 Beav. 2 I(Eng, 1854);
McLeod v. Drummond, 14 Ves. 353 (18o7); Nugent v. Gifford, i Atk. 463 (Eng. 1738).
"The addition to the name of the holder of the corporate securities of words indicating
a fiduciary capacity give notice of the existence of a trust, Shaw v. Spencer, supra note 27;
Kenworthy v. Equitable Trust Co., 218 Pa. 286, 67 AtI. 469 (19o7).
"It is possible that the registration of the corporation may have done no injury, to the
cesiui que trust. Crawford v. Provincial Ins. Co., 8 U. C. C. P. 263 (Canada, 1858) ; Hildyard v. South Sea Co., 2 P. Wins. 76 (Eng., 1722); cf. Case v. Bank, Io U. S. 446 (1879).
"Marbury v. Ehlen, 72 Md. 206, ig Atl. 648 (189o); Bayard v. Farmers and Mechanics
Bank, 52 Pa. 232 (1866) ; Chapman v. City Council, 28 S. C. 373, 63 S. E. 158 (1887). The
origin of this view is usually attributed to Mr. Justice Taney in Lowry v. Com'l and
Farmer's Bank, Fed. Cas. No. 8581, at 1O4O, 1o47 (C. C. D. Md. 1848); Behrends and
Elliott, Resposibilities and Liabilities of the Transfer Agent and Registrar (1931) 4 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 2o3.
"LowELT, TRANSFER oF STOCK (1884) § 155.
"Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. 55 (1796) ; Bank of England v. Parsons, 5 Ves. 665

(18oo).

mDEL RLv. CODE (1915) c. 98, § 3396; ILL.REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) C.32, § 29; MAss.
GEN. LAWS (Tercentenary ed. 1932) ch. 203, § 21; KY. STAT. (Carroll, 193o) C. 128, § 4707;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 4, § 7.
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The view of these statutes has been adopted by the Uniform Act in Section 3,4 thereby freeing the corporation from liability where it acts without
knowledge of the intended breach or without such knowledge as amounts to bad
faith. This applies only where the stock is registered in the fiduciary's name
and not where registered in the name of the principal, decedent, or cestui que
trust. Therefore, it constitutes no interference with provisions as to inheritance
taxes. The Act not only protects the corporation but should render obsolete
such undesirable practices as trustees registering stock in their own names without disclosing the trust.
Although the Negotiable Instruments Law applies the test of good faith
in determining whether the holder of an instrument has notice of an infirmity,88
most courts will not recognize a bona fide purchaser for value as a holder in due
course, if having knowledge of the trust he did not use reasonable care to investigate the authority of the trustee. 8 This rule is applied irrespective of
whether the transaction was for the personal benefit of the trustee or not. Yet
in other situations the fact of negligence has not been a bar."
The Uniform
Fiduciaries Act attempts to bring the law of trusts into conformity with the
Negotiable Instruments Law.38 Where the instrument is not given in a transaction known by the taker to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, the
transaction is presumed proper, and the taker is not bound to inquire. This is
rebutted only by evidence of actual knowledge or bad faith. However, where
the transaction is known to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, and the
instrument is drawn by a third person payable to the principal or fiduciary as
such, and then endorsed to the creditor, 9 or drawn by the fiduciary payable to
the creditor, 40 the presumption established by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act is
that the act was a breach of trust and the taker is liable for participation if this
in fact occurs. But Section 6 provides that where the instrument is drawn by
a fiduciary payable to himself personally, or to a third person and by him transferred to the fiduciary, and is thereafter transferred, the taker is not charged
with notice 4'even though the transaction may be for the known benefit of the
fiduciary, unless, of course, there is actual notice of the breach or bad faith.
The principle underlying this rule has been most aptly set forth by Justice Loring
in Johnson Kettel Co. v. Longley Luncheon Co.:42

"The distinction seems to be this: Where the corporation note or other
negotiable instrument is payable to the creditor of the individual, the transaction which on the face of the note or other instrument is represented to
have taken place is an appropriation of the corporation's money to the
payment of the individual's debts and is bad unless shown good. Since
the transaction is bad unless shown to be good and since the purchaser took
with notice (given on the face of the note or other instrument), his rights
depend upon the transaction's being or not being in fact what it purports
on the face of the note or instrument to be and no question of a purchase
lUNFORM
FrmuctARIEs Acr § 3, 9 U. L. A. 149.
supra note 13.
'Third National Bank v. Lange, 51 Md. 138 (1878); Ward v. City Trust Co., 192
N. Y. 61, 84 N. E. 585 (19o8) ; Ford v. Brown, 114 Tenn. 467, 88 N. W. lO36 (19o5).
'Link v. Jackson, 158 Mo. App. 63, 139 S. W. 588 (1911) ; see'Hotchkiss v. National
Banks, 88 U. S.354, 359 (1874).
' The Missouri statute foreshadowing the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, required actual notice
to create liability in the payee for breach of trust. Mo. Laws 1917, 144.
UNIFORM FmUClAREs AcT 9 4. 9 U. L. A. 15o.
UNIFoRM FmuclA IEs ACT § 5. 9 U. L. A. 151.
UNIFORM FIDUCiARmS Aer § 6. 9 U. L. A. 151.
1:2o7 Mass. 52, 56, 92 N. E. 1035, 1037 (91o).
'See
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in good faith can arise . . . But on the other hand where the note or
other instrument is payable to the treasurer or to a third person, and after
being indorsed by the payee in blank is used by the treasurer in paying his
individual debt, the transaction which on the face of the instrument is
represented to have taken place is a payment by the corporation to the
treasurer (where the note or other instrument was payable to him) and
a payment by the corporation to the third person and another payment by
the third person to the treasurer (where the note or other instrument was
payable to a third person as stated above). In each of these last two cases
the transaction is good unless it is proved to be bad. In that case, if the
corporation proves that the application of the note or other instrument of
the corporation was a wrongful one, the rights of the creditor depend upon
his having acted in good faith."
In the majority of jurisdictions, a bank is not bound to inquire into the
authority of a fiduciary to make a deposit.43 This extends so far as to permit a fiduciary to credit to his personal account a check payable to him as
trustee without creating in the bank any duty to make inquiry. This latter
result has been specifically approved by the Uniform FiuciariesAct,44 for the
purpose of abolishing the exceptions adopted in several states. Likewise, both
under numerous decisions 4r and under the Act,46 the bank is not liable for payments of checks either from an account in the name of the fiduciary as such, or
in the name of the principal, or from the fiduciary's personal account when trust
funds have been deposited there. But where the check is payable to the drawee
bank and delivered in payment of or as security for the personal debt of the
fiduciary to it, the bank is liable if the act is in fact a breach of trust.47 It is
obvious in such case that the bank stands in a position as creditor and the
same rules must apply. Therefore the rule of Section 6, that a check payable to
the fiduciary personally requires no inquiry, should discharge48 the bank in such
case; but the decisions apparently have made no distinction.
The final substantive section of the Act4 0 considers a deposit by two or
more trustees, with authorization to one or more of the trustees to draw checks,
and relieves both the bank and holders of a duty to inquire whether such authorization is a breach of trust.",
To date there have been three decisions in which a court definitely cited
the Act as controlling, 6 all three in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The
'Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 211 Mass. 4o9, 97 N. E. 916 (1912) ; Kendall v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 230 Mass. 238, Iug N. E. 86I (I918) ; Havana Central R. R. Co. v. Knickerbocker
Trust Co., 193 N. Y. 422, 92 N. E. 12 (igio); Brookhouse v. Union Publishing Co., 73

N. H. 368, 62 Atl. 219 (igo5).
"UNrFORm FmuciARmns Act § 9. 9 U. L. A. I53.
' Havana Central R. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 204 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913) ; City
of Newburyport v. First National Bank, 216 Mass. 304, io3 N. E. 782 (914) ; Hood v.
Kensington National Bank, 23o Pa. 5o8, 79 Atl. 714 (1911); Gray v. Johnston, L. R.
3 H. L. I (1868).

"Section 9. Supra note 44.
FIDucmEs Acr §§ 7-8. 9 U. L. A. 153. See section 9,supra note 44. De'- UNriFoR
cisions in accord with the Act are: Union Stock Yards Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S.411,
ii Sup. Ct. 118 (I89O); U. S. F. and G. Co. v. Union Bank, 228 Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 6th,
1915); Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y. xo6, ii2 N. E. 759 (1916).
"Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. etc. v. Ninth Bank and Trust Co., 3o6 Pa. 148, I58 Atl. 251
(1932), and cases cited supra note 47.
"UNIFORM

FIDUCIARIEs Acr § IO. 9 U.

L. A. 155.

A trustee cannot bind his co-trustees unless expressly authorized and then only as to
ministerial acts. A payment from principal is probably ministerial, but not one from income,
cf. LOSING, TausvzE's HANDBOOic (1898) 87. The act relieves the third person of the duty
of solving these problems.
'The Act was cited but not applied (since it is not adopted in Minnesota) in Rodger v.
Banker's Nat. Bank, 179 Minn. 197, =29 N. W. 90 (193o).
W
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first, Norristown-Penn Trust Co. v. Middleton,52 was a case in which a treasurer of a bank, embezzling funds, drew checks on the bank's funds to pay his
own debt. One of the checks was drawn to a fictitious person, endorsed with
said name, and then delivered to a third party. The court applied Section 6,
holding that this was not notice of a breach of trust and left it to the jury upon
the question of bad faith.58 The other checks were drawn directly to the creditor who was bound at his peril to inquire as to the right of the maker.
The decision as a whole may well be taken as a precedent in the other states
which have adopted the Act.
Unfortunately, the next decision was a blow to the essential purpose of the
Act. In Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives, etc. v. Ninth Bank
and Trust Company,54 a trustee wrongfully drew a check on a trust account
to the order of himself and deposited it in the drawee bank in payment of an
overdraft. The court held the bank liable both in its capacity of creditor and as
depository. Whether through fault of counsel, or the court's disagreement with
the legislature, Section 6 55 enacting that a check by the fiduciary to his own
order, even in payment of a personal debt, imputes no notice was neither distinguished nor applied, but rather the rule necessitating inquiry where checks
are drawn payable to a creditor (Section 5).'11 Having thus imputed notice of
the intended breach, the bank was also liable as a depository for paying the
check. It cannot be argued that the particular facts of this case constitute notice,
since there are no other facts but those specifically stated in the Act as constituting constructive notice. Nor was the question of actual knowledge or bad
faith decided by a jury, since judgment was rendered for want of a sufficient
affidavit of defense. How can the movement of uniformity,"! attempting to
make practically binding the decision of any state on a uniform act, flourish
when such a decision is rendered in one of the first interpretations of an Act?
The third case, Union Bank and Trust Company v. Girard Trust Company,5 s held that where a teller and assistant treasurer of a bank, duly authorized and registered to execute clearing house due bills, issue such a bill upon the
instruction of the vice-president in payment of stock purchased by the president,
the payee was not put upon inquiry. Section 5 '9 imputes notice where the transaction is for the personal benefit of the fiduciary drawer; but here the drawers
were not the president but the teller and assistant treasurer. Since it was not
in payment of their personal debt, the payee was not put upon notice. The
decision illustrates a literal interpretation of the Act.
By means of the foregoing principles, it is the purpose of the draftsmen
of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act to facilitate the performance by fiduciaries of
their obligations. The ancient rules often cast a heavy burden on honest fiduciaries, and yet were of little value in restraining dishonest ones. The serious
penalties which overhung the head of a purchaser regardless of his good faith,
and the uncertain duties arising from particular situations, made prudent men
unwilling to transact business with fiduciaries. The Act should remedy both
evils, being very liberal in not imputing constructive notice, and establishing
Pa. 522, 15o Atl. 885 (193o).
' The fact that the transaction occurred in an unusual manner was sufficient evidence

M3oo

to sustain the verdict of the jury that bad faith was present.
'Supra note 48.
Section 6, supra note 41.
r Section 5, supra note 4o.
See Report of the Committee on Uniformity of Judicial Decisions,

HANIDBOOK
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"3o7 Pa. 488, 161 At. 865 (933),
'Supra note 40.

(933)

81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 333.
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uniformity by its universal adoption. But decisions such as that in Pennsylvania
Company, etc. v. Ninth Bank and Trust Company, ° will render the Act useless. For a court to disagree with the policy of the legislature or at least to be
unwitting of it, and arrive at the opposite conclusion, will keep the law uncertain in that state, as well as destroy uniformity with states strictly construing the
Act. It remains for the future to disclose whether the courts will, interpret the
Act in accordance with their personal opinions of justice or construe it as written
and thereby effectuate the beneficial purposes of the Commissioners.
T. K. W., Jr.
8

0Supranote 48.

